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Abstract: This paper examines one of the ways in which the classical historian Sallust was read in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, and what this reveals about medieval moral thought. In this period, Sallust’s 
discussion of the character and virtues of Julius Caesar and Cato the Younger became a focus for annotation and 
commentary. Caesar and Cato were read as the embodiment of contrasting, even opposed, ideas of moral virtue 
— one liberal and forgiving, the other just and unbending. As medieval commentators recognised, both men 
embodied Roman virtue, but neither could be straightforwardly imitated. Medieval authors who considered the 
deeds of these two great Romans were obliged to address how the exercise of virtue was conditioned by 
circumstance and emphasised the importance of heeding counsel and engaging in debate before taking action. As 
a result, moral thought in this period can be seen as more contingent and pragmatic and less absolutist than it is 
sometimes supposed to have been. 
 
INTRODUCTION: JUDGEMENT IN ATHENS 
John of Salisbury’s Policraticus (c.1159), a text written for the instruction of educated 
men who launched themselves into the dangerous and morally murky world of the 
court, constructs much of its advice from the material of the classical past (both 
historical and invented). In book 4, John discusses the nature of justice, and relates 
an exemplum taken from Valerius Maximus’ early first-century collection of moral 
stories, Factorum ac dicta memorabilia. During the time when the Roman general 
Dolabella was imperial proconsul in Asia, he referred a difficult legal case to the 
Athenian Aeropagus, the highest Greek court. The facts of the matter were 
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undisputed: the accused was a woman who had killed both her husband and son by 
poisoning them. The woman freely admitted to the crime, yet argued she should 
escape punishment, for she had only killed the two men because they had killed 
another of her sons, an innocent boy. She believed that the law should not impose 
any punishment for the poisoning, for she had only acted to avenge an injury done 
to her. The question of how much regard the law should give to this ‘defence’ caused 
considerable difficulty. The Athenian judges examined the case at length, then 
summoned the woman. They pronounced their decision: the offender was to be 
punished, and she should return for sentencing – one hundred years from that day.1 
In John’s view, the decision the Athenian judges arrived at was the only 
viable moral choice. He explained that he had chosen this story to illustrate the 
conflicting demands of public duties, familial loyalty, and the necessity of punishing 
crimes. There was, he suggested, something to admire in a woman who pursued 
justice even when it meant punishing her own family members, but nonetheless she 
had exceeded reasonable limits by responding to a crime with another crime. The 
case served to illustrate a broader moral point: princes, and those who serve them, 
should not merely love justice, but be mindful that the choices on offer might not 
always be straightforward ones. 
 The substance of this paper is how authors writing between c.1050 and c.1250 
(‘the long twelfth century’) addressed classical Roman virtue – virtue of the 
senatorial and imperial variety – not Greek jurisprudence. Yet John of Salisbury’s 
borrowing from Valerius Maximus is a useful place to begin, because, to say the 
least, the story John presents is not necessarily what we expect from a medieval 
exemplum: it invites ambivalence rather than containing a straightforward moral 
message, and it strikes a resounding note of uncertainty. There were compelling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Turnholt: Brepols, 1993), iv.11, pp. 268–9. 
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moral arguments both for permitting the woman to go unpunished, and for imposing 
a punishment for her actions. 
Some scholars – Cary Nederman, for example – have explained the 
ambiguities of Policraticus as particular to John of Salisbury’s intellectual formation. 
Nederman casts John as reviving a Ciceronian tradition of academic scepticism, a 
philosophical framework which recognised that some matters are arguable, some 
cases disputable, and not every matter can be resolved by the application of a moral 
absolute.2 This places John in deliberate imitation of Ciceronian scepticism, one of 
the few twelfth-century scholastic authors who picked up on this current of thought. 
The argument of this paper, however, is that this type of ambiguity concerning the 
moral course of action – particularly the morally virtuous course of action when 
punishing an offender – was far from limited to John of Salisbury, and one did not 
need to look to scepticism to find warrant for it. It is evident in the ways in which 
twelfth- and thirteenth-century readers and authors engaged with the late Roman 
historian Sallust, and his Bellum Catilinae. It is particularly evident when one traces 
the ways in which one section of the text was read, received and redeployed. The 
models of Roman virtue to be found in Sallust provided twelfth-century readers 
with an ambivalent and debatable legacy. The sections of Catiline which focused on a 
senatorial argument over the punishment of offenders offered medieval readers a 
frame through which they could conceptualise a political and moral debate about 
the nature of justice, judgment and punishment. Sallust could be (and was) used by 
twelfth-century authors to argue the need for prudence and prudent counsel to 
guide the application of punishment. As such, the way in which the twelfth-century 
read Catiline demonstrates how classical ‘historical’ texts could provide frameworks 
for ethical discussion about the limits of virtue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cary J. Nederman, ‘Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelianism: John of Salisbury’s Skepticism and 
Twelfth-Century Moral Philosophy’, in Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century, ed. by István Bejczy 
and Richard Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 175–95. 
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THE TWELFTH-CENTURY SALLUSTIAN REVIVIAL 
Sallust (86–35BC) is one of the authors most closely associated with the revival of 
interest in classical antiquity during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. While there 
had been interest in Sallust’s writing in the earlier Middle Ages, there was an 
evident increase in copying of both Jugurtha and the Bellum Catilinae from the 
eleventh century on, particularly in the areas of modern England, France and the 
Netherlands.3 Jugurtha relates the story of the war between the eponymous King of 
Numidia and Rome between 111BC and 105BC, while Catiline describes the 
conspiracy of Lucius Sergius Catilina against Rome in 63BC and his eventual defeat. 
The two works were often regarded as two parts of the same text and copied 
together, which explains why they survive today in similar (and similarly striking) 
numbers. Over 80 copies of Catiline and 90 copies of Jugurtha survive from the 
twelfth century.4 A third Sallustian text, the Historiae, was only known in fragments 
in the Middle Ages, as it is today. 
Beryl Smalley categorised the use of Sallust in this period as falling into three 
distinct categories: he was primarily valued as a moralist, secondarily as a stylistic 
model for authorial emulation, and finally – in a much more limited fashion – 
Sallust’s writings were treated as a store of historical information.5 Sallust’s account 
of the growth of corruption and the fall of once virtuous polities had obvious 
resonances with Christian readings of the Roman Empire, and was more generally 
compatible with a medieval Christian vision of the universe. Although Sallust could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Birger Munk Olsen, ‘La diffusion et l'étude des historiens antiques au XIIe siècle’, in Mediaeval 
Antiquity, ed. by Andries Welkenhuysen et al. (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995) pp. 21–43. 
4 Olsen, ‘La diffusion’, p. 22. 
5 Beryl Smalley, ‘Sallust in the Middle Ages’, in Classical Influences on European Culture A.D. 500 to 
1500, ed. by R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 165–76. See also Patricia 
J. Osmond and Robert W. Ulery, ‘Sallustius’, in Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Medieval 
and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries, vol. 8 (Washington DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2003), pp. 183–326. 
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provide valuable historical evidence about the late republic – potentially providing 
an alternative tradition to later ‘imperial’ writers – his significance as a historian was 
more limited. Two (complementary) explanations for this have been advanced. First, 
Catiline and Jugurtha did not look the way which medieval readers expected their 
histories to look. Both concentrated on relatively short spans of time, a far cry from 
the longue durée vision of medieval Christian historiography exemplified in annals, 
chronicles and universal histories. Secondly, in the twelfth-century revival of 
historical writing, medieval authors preferred to turn to late antique Christian 
writers as their source material. These were often authors who had themselves read 
or borrowed from Sallust. Thus Roman material was taken up through a Christian 
synthesis, through works like Eutropius’ Breviarium. In this sense, the ‘historical’ 
Sallust was rarely received directly, and there are few – if any – histories which 
directly model themselves on Catiline or Jugurtha. 
It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the reach of Sallust. He was 
the only historian studied as part of the high medieval school curriculum, alongside 
a host of Latin poets: Statius, Virgil, Lucan and Homer in translation.6 Of Sallust’s 
authority in the minds of twelfth-century readers, there should be no doubt. 
The best demonstration of this state of affairs – Sallust as a valued moral 
source, but not a preeminent historical model – is found in William of Malmesbury’s 
historical writing. William is widely reckoned to be among the most accomplished of 
twelfth-century historians, a writer who took a great degree of trouble over the 
sources for his histories. William reaches for Sallust as a source of pithy quotations 
and statements about morality, rather than historical res gestae. In that sense, Sallust 
belongs to the process of ‘sprinkling with Roman salt’; i.e. drawing on antique 
writers to furnish quotations, models for competitive stylistic emulation, and as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Olsen, ‘La diffusion’, pp. 31–3. 
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nod to the educated amongst one’s audience, who would recognise the Sallustian 
shape of a passage.7 
 This narrative of Sallustian reception is essentially convincing in its outlines. 
The challenge it presents, however, is that very little has been said about the specifics 
of how Sallust was read and used. Too often the label of ‘moralist’ is applied rather 
vaguely, used to suggest that Sallust provided a general narrative of decline which 
could be fitted to almost any polity, but with relatively little content attached. Much 
more can in fact be done to fill in the specifics of Sallustian usage. 
 The need to consider the shape of the twelfth-century Sallust is thrown into 
sharper relief, moreover, when one considers the work done on the later history of 
Sallustian reception. We have a much clearer picture of how Sallust was read, 
received and repackaged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and, in particular, 
a developed account of the significance of Sallust in northern Italy. In Italian 
communes, Sallust could be used to bolster arguments about civic government and 
civic liberties: invoking the early parts of the text (especially the rhetoric of Catiline 
7.1–3 which describes the glory which free states are capable of attaining) could be 
used to make a call for the defence of the city and the common good. These passages 
were borrowed by writers including Ptolemy of Lucca and Coluccio Salutati.8 Like 
the owl of Minerva, Sallust took flight in the fourteenth century – providing a 
classical endorsement of political life.9 But no similar survey for the twelfth-century 
Sallust has been made. Were there particular parts of his writing which generated 
particular attention? And, if so, what might that tell us about those readers and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Lars Boje Mortensen, ‘The Texts and Contexts of Ancient Roman History in Twelfth-Century 
Western Scholarship’, in Perceptions of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe, ed. by Paul Magdalino 
(London: Hambledon Press, 1992), pp. 99–116, esp. 103–4; and Michael Winterbottom, ‘The Gesta 
regum of William of Malmesbury’, Journal of Medieval Latin 5 (1995), 158–73, esp. 169. 
8 See Patricia J. Osmond, ‘“Princeps Historiae Romanae”: Sallust in Renaissance Political Thought’, 
Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome (1995), 101–43, and Osmond, ‘Catiline in Fiesole and 
Florence: The After-Life of a Roman Conspirator’, International Journal of the Classical Tradition 7 (2000), 
3–38. 
9 Cf. Smalley, ‘Sallust’, p. 165. 
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interest in the political (or moral) uses of Sallust? This article is an attempt to offer 
some tentative conclusions about how certain parts of Sallust were used in the 
twelfth century, and the political and moral ideas he might be made to speak to. It 
makes no claim to cover all the possible uses of Sallust, nor even all the possible uses 
of Catiline, but instead attempts to highlight a single, significant political usage of a 
single passage, and to connect his history-writing to broader moral discourses. 
The section of Sallust’s writing on which this article focuses is chapters 51–4 
of Catiline. This section is close to the end of the work. It does not strictly concern the 
conspirator Catiline himself, but events in Rome. Catiline remains at large outside 
Rome, but his co-conspirator Lentulus and some of his followers have been 
captured, and their fate awaits determination by the Roman senate. The Roman 
senate meets to discuss the matter at the instigation of Cicero, who, as consul, has led 
the initiative against Catiline. The question put to the senators is how Rome should 
deal with the captured conspirators. It is important to note that at this point in the 
text, their guilt is not in doubt: it has already been determined that Catiline’s 
followers have acted against the state. 
 Sallust’s text then narrates these senatorial orations in detail, although Sallust 
is here constructing the speeches, not recording them verbatim.10 First, Julius Caesar 
(then praetor designate) stands to speak (Catiline 51). The oration is too lengthy to 
quote in full, and so I summarise only its main themes: Caesar begins by insisting 
that the matter be discussed calmly and without passion intruding, asserting that ‘all 
men who deliberate upon difficult questions ought to be free from hatred and 
friendship, anger and pity’ (qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque 
misericordia vacuos esse decet).11 Caesar invokes several historical examples to make 
the case that Lentulus and the conspirators ought not to be put to death. To do so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For other references to Caesar’s speech, see Suetonius, Life of the Caesars: Julius Caesar, 14; Appian, 
The Civil Wars 2.6. 
11 Catiline, 51.1. Translations are taken from the edition of J. C. Rolfe (London: Heinemann, 1931). 
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would be a reaction from passion, and wise decisions are only made when men set 
aside their wrath or pity. The danger, Caesar argues, is that the senators will let their 
anger overcome all other considerations, and be tempted to step beyond the 
penalties permitted under the law. It is particularly lamentable when men of high 
status and office give way to anger; restraint should be expected in leaders of a 
polity. Caesar argues that ‘in the highest portion there is the least freedom of 
action… for what in others is called wrath, this in a ruler is termed insolence and 
cruelty’.12 
Caesar’s speech calls for moderation, and for the senators to consider how 
their actions today may set a bad precedent for punishment in future cases. He 
presents a series of historical examples which demonstrate how divergence from 
established legal standards may initially seem appropriate, but quickly pave the way 
to tyranny. Allowing excessive punishment in the present may in future lead to the 
state becoming vicious. More particularly, Caesar points to the fact that those under 
whose leadership the empire grew great were content to exile the condemned, not to 
put them to death – and this is the example to be imitated. Caesar’s oration 
concludes with the recommendation that the prisoners’ goods be confiscated and the 
prisoners themselves imprisoned – to protect the common safety – but that their 
lives be spared. 
Caesar’s speech is followed by that of Cato of Utica, also known as Cato the 
Younger (52). His oration is a direct challenge to the premises which Caesar has laid 
down. Exceptional punishment is necessary, Cato contends, because of the 
exceptional nature of the danger posed by the Catilinian conspiracy: the state itself is 
at stake – not merely individual goods or personal property. Generosity and 
gentleness towards conspirators is no virtue when it will endanger the republic 
itself. More importantly, any decision reached by the senate will send a message to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Catiline, 51.14. 
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Catiline’s army (as yet uncaptured, and beyond Rome). Any weakness will 
strengthen their resolve, and encourage them to advance on the city. Where Caesar 
appeals to an ideal of Rome as a mature city which can stay its hand, Cato advances 
an argument about corruption and weakness: the city is vulnerable precisely because 
it is too idle and lazy to defend itself, because, through kindness to wrong-doers, it 
has fallen away from higher historical standards. Conspiracy to destroy the republic 
is not a crime which Cato believes should be tolerated – and the dire circumstances 
are such that a city beset by foes from without and within has only one course of 
action. Cato concludes by arguing that death is the only punishment appropriate to 
those who are caught red-handed in the commission of a capital offence. 
While these two speeches are stirring (and lengthy), they would have proved 
less interesting to medieval readers but for what follows. Sallust then introduces his 
own reflections on what these two speeches revealed of the respective characters of 
Julius Caesar and Cato. He notes that ‘within my own memory there have appeared 
two men of towering merit, though of diverse character’.13 Sallust then offers a 
comparison of the two men, built around the contention that Julius Caesar and Cato 
represent opposed, but equally admirable virtues which relate to how public justice 
and public life is conducted: clemency and severity; generosity and austerity. 
 
In birth then, in years and in eloquence, they were about equal; in greatness of soul 
they were evenly matched, and likewise in renown, although the renown of each was 
different. Caesar was held great because of his benefactions and lavish generosity, 
Cato for the uprightness of his life. The former became famous for his gentleness and 
compassion, the austerity of the latter had brought him prestige. Caesar gained glory 
by giving, helping, and forgiving; Cato by never stooping to bribery. One was a 
refuge for the unfortunate, the other a scourge for the wicked. The good nature of the 
one was applauded, the steadfastness of the other. Finally, Caesar had schooled 
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himself to work hard and sleep little, to devote himself to the welfare of his friends 
and neglect his own, to refuse nothing which was worth the giving. He longed for 
great power, an army, a new war to give scope for his brilliant merit. Cato, on the 
contrary, cultivated self-control, propriety, but above all austerity. He did not vie 
with the rich in riches nor in intrigue with the intriguer, but with the active in good 
works, with the self-restrained in moderation, with the blameless in integrity. He 
preferred to be, rather than to seem, virtuous; hence the less he sought fame, the 
more it pursued him. 
 
In the event, it is Cato’s advice which is followed by the senate – but the two orations 
and the character comparisons stand on their own. 
 
JULIUS CAESAR AND CATO THE YOUNGER IN THE 
TWELFTH-CENTURY SCHOOLS 
Sallust was not the only author who provided medieval authors with information 
about Julius Caesar and Cato. Sallust’s portrayal of the two figures sat alongside 
other traditions and other sources of information. Although Caesar’s own writings 
were relatively little known, he made a considerable impression as a historical 
figure.14 Caesar would ultimately be memorialised as one of the ‘Nine Worthies’ – a 
virtuous pagan to stand alongside the Trojan Hector and Alexander of Macedon. 
Nonetheless, Sallust was a key source for Caesar: far better known than Caesar’s 
own De bello Gallico. Cato was perhaps less celebrated. Cato of Utica – the Cato of 
Catiline – should not be confused with Cato the Elder, Cato the Stoic, the grandfather 
of the younger Cato. Medieval tradition recognised that there had been two Catos: it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For fuller discussion of this, see Almut Suerbaum, ‘The Middle Ages’, in A Companion to Julius 
Caesar, ed. by Miriam Griffin (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), esp. pp. 317–18. This is not to 
suggest that the verdict on Caesar was universally positive – as Suerbaum discusses, certain authors, 
including Lucan, put a more negative spin on Caesar’s desire for popular acclaim. For one twelfth-
century account of Caesar’s life, see Ralph Diceto, Abbrevationes chronicorum, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls 
Series 58, London: Longmans, 1876), pp. 51–2. 
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was the elder, for example, who was recognised as the author of the Disticha Catonis 
– the elementary work of moral introduction for school students.15 The younger 
Cato, of Catiline, underwent a slow process of ‘Christianisation’, his stoic sensibilities 
providing material that could be readily worked into Christian virtues, and as a 
famously virtuous non-Christian he ultimately became one of Dante’s guides 
through the Commedia. At times the two men – grandfather and grandson – may 
have become elided, but those who had read the accessus tradition were aware that 
there were two figures of this name. That said, one might speculate that the 
reputation of the elder Cato served to burnish that of his grandson, as a guardian of 
senatorial propriety and virtue. 
Though Julius Caesar and Cato might be encountered in other places, their 
appearance in Catiline received considerable attention. Indeed, 51–4 seems to have 
been one of the most frequently and closely read parts of the text. Where we have 
‘full’ copies in the manuscript tradition, both the speeches of Caesar and Cato and 
Sallust’s comparison of the two men are often marked by (short) marginal notes.16 
Interest in the speeches in fact began long before the twelfth century, as ninth-
century manuscripts which extract only the orations from Catiline and Jugurtha 
attest.17 The speeches were also excerpted as core components in twelfth century 
florilegia, and hence were transmitted even more broadly – even among those who 
had not made a detailed study of Sallust. Most important in demonstrating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Richard Hazelton, ‘The Christianization of “Cato”: the Disticha Catonis in the Light of Late 
Medieval Commentaries’, Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), 157–73; Filippo Gianferrari, ‘Pro patria mori: 
From the Disticha Catonis to Dante's Cato’, Dante Studies 135 (2017), 1–30. 
16 For this study, I have consulted Bodleian Library MS Barlow 45 (an early thirteenth-century English 
manuscript), and MS Rawlinson G. 43 (an early twelfth-century manuscript from southern France). 
For a discussion of commentaries in Sallust in Germany, see Carmen Cardelle de Hartmann, ‘Sallust 
im St. Emmeram: Handschriften und Kommentaire in der Bibliothek des Klosters St. Emmeram 
(Regensburg)’, Journal of Medieval Latin 18 (2008), 1–23, esp. 11–12, which highlights the attention paid 
to the orations in marginal annotations and notes the most glossed passages. For Flanders, see 
Andrew J. Turner, ‘Reading Sallust in Twelfth-Century Flanders’, International Journal of the Classical 
Tradition 21 (2014), 198–222, which emphasises that twelfth-century glosses on Sallust were 
particularly interested how classical terminology could be translated and explained for twelfth-
century readers. 
17 For example, Vatican Lat 3864; cf. Smalley, ‘Sallust’, p. 169. 
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increasing knowledge of Catiline 51–4 is the Florilegium Gallicum – a text originally 
compiled in Orleans in the later twelfth century, and the most copied florilegium of 
the thirteenth century.18 It presents a series of extracts from twenty classical authors, 
including Aulus Gellius, Horace, Juvenal, and Cicero, the speeches of Caesar and 
Cato in Catiline, and Sallust’s comparison of the two, which is provided under the 
heading ‘De moribus Cesaris et Catonis mixtim’.19 In short: Sallust was widely 
available throughout this period; and chapters 51–4 of Catiline particularly so. 
 Alongside the Florilegium Gallicum, another florilegium contributed to the way 
in which Sallust was read and received: the Moralium dogma philosophorum (possibly 
composed c. 1150).20 The text is mainly a composite of Cicero’s De officiis and 
Seneca’s De beneficiis, but has relevance here for two reasons. The first is that its 
treatment of justice (iustitia) recognises that the virtue has a dual aspect: it can be 
divided into severity (severitas) and liberality (liberalitas). This approach could serve 
to support the distinction that Sallust discovered into the characters of Cato and 
Caesar – one severe, one more lenient. Indeed, the discussion in the Moralium dogma 
philosophorum includes several cautions about the application of severitas, lest it 
become excessive, and emphasising the need to steer a course between excess and 
absence.21 The second is that the Moralium dogma philosophorum, although reliant on 
Cicero’s De officiis (in particular, II.14–15) for much of the structure of its discussion 
of justice, also includes a number of quotations from Sallust, who is described as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Richard H. Rouse, “‘Florilegia’ and Latin Classical Authors in Twelfth and Thirteenth Century 
Orléans’, Viator 10 (1979) 131–160; see also B. L. Ullmann, ‘Classical Authors in Certain Medieval 
Florilegia’, Classical Philology 27 (1932), 1–42 and Birger Munk Olsen, ‘Les classiques latins dans les 
florilèges médiévaux antérieurs au XIIIe siècle’, Revue d'histoire des textes 9 (1979), 47–121; which also 
discusses the role of Sallust in the Florilegium Duacense. The text has been edited by Johannes 
Hamacher, Florilegium Gallicum (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1975). 
19 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 17903; the comparison is found at f.77r. 
20 Philippe Delhaye, ‘Une adaptation du “De officiis” au XIIe siècle: Le “Moralium dogma 
philosophorum”’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 16 (1949), 227–58. For arguments over the 
authorship of the text, see the outline provided in John R. Williams, ‘The Quest for the Author of the 
Moralium Dogma Philosophorum, 1931–1956’, Speculum 32 (1957), 736–47. For the text, Das Moralium 
dogma philosophorum des Guillaume de Conches, lateinisch, altfranzösich und mittelniederfränkisch, 
herausgegeben, ed. John Holmberg (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells boktryckeri, 1929). 
21 Moralium Dogma Philosophorum, ed. Holmberg, pp. 12–13. 
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poeta to rank alongside Horace and Lucan. The quotations from Catiline – although 
not more than a handful – are almost exclusively short extracts from the speeches of 
Cato and Caesar.22  
The accessus ad auctores tradition also provided medieval readers with 
instructions on how to read Sallust as an author, and how to understand the main 
themes of his works.23 Within this tradition, Sallust was not considered to be an 
elementary text, but as part of a curriculum of more advanced instruction in Latin 
grammar.24 The accessus writing emphasised the moral qualities of texts; but what is 
significant is the ideas drawn out in relation to Sallust in particular.25 This is evident 
from the Dialogus super auctores (somewhere between 1100 and 1150), attributed to 
Conrad of Hirsau.26 Conrad’s accessus to Sallust places him (as an author) between 
Cicero and Boethius. The accessus emphasises the value of reading Sallust with 
Cicero (thus burnishing the reputation of the text further) – not least because the 
events Sallust describes in Catiline relate to Cicero’s personal providentia et prudentia 
in acting to save the Roman state from Catiline’s conspiracy. Sallust thus also 
provides a means of learning about the historical Cicero. When Conrad addresses 
the ‘materia’ of Sallust’s text, he emphasises that this is a text which discusses the 
preservation or downfall of the res publica. It discusses how the perversity of the 
citizens threatens proper order. As such, Sallust’s intention (intentio) was to teach 
(docere) readers about how the senators and rectors of the republic considered this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Extracts from the speeches: ‘de benficientia operea et pecuniae’, quoting Catiline 51.1–2 (Holmberg, 
p. 21); ‘De religione’, quoting Catiline 52.29 (p. 24); Pudicita is discussed with reference to Catiline 51.3; 
and ‘de bonis corporis’ quotes from Catiline 51.12. (p. 54). ‘De magnificentia’ (p. 38), reproduces the 
famous first line of the text, on the distinction between humans and beasts. 
23 For an introduction to the accessus tradition in this period, see Alastair Minnis, and A. B. Scott, 
Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism c. 1100–c. 1375 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. p. 13, for the 
influence of the ‘type C’ prologue. Conrad’s accessus is discussed at 37–64. See also Minnis, Medieval 
Theory of Authorship (London: Scolar Press, 1984). For a general overview of the commentary genre, 
see Paul G. Schmidt, ‘The Commentator Knows Better than the Author’, Journal of Medieval Latin 18 
(2009), 117–29. 
24 Rita Copeland, ‘The Curricular Classics in the Middle Ages’, in The Oxford History of Classical 
Reception in English Literature, Volume 1, 800–1558, ed. by Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), p. 26.  
25 For the accessus tradition, see Accessus ad auctores, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden: Brill, 1970). 
26 cf. Leslie G. Whitbread, ‘Conrad of Hirsau as Literary Critic’, Speculum 47 (1972), 234–45. 
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matter, and acted to prevent ruin – to understand what is honestum (worthy) and 
what is iustum (just).  
The accessus tradition was intended only to provide a brief introduction to key 
themes of a text. Those who read its introduction to Sallust would find not only an 
emphasis on the dangers of a corrupt citizenry, but would also have their attention 
drawn to the senatorial response to public danger. Taken together, manuscript 
annotations, florilegia and the accessus all point in the same direction: suggesting to 
medieval readers that the final chapters of Catiline – the senatorial debate – 
represented the most important part of the text. It was there Sallust set out an 
account of two contrasting characters or natures, and an account of two polarised 
forms of moral virtue. 
 The speeches of Catiline 51–4 were borrowed by twelfth-century writers and 
placed in the mouths of other figures. Such examples are numerous. John of 
Salisbury, for example, in a discussion of judges and judicial office, invoked Julius 
Caesar (ut Iulius Caesar ait), warning that the mind cannot easily perceive truth when 
anger and hate, fear and friendship stand in the way.27 The same passage was 
adapted in Cosmas of Prague’s Historia Boemorum in an address which advises those 
in power to very carefully listen to counsel: they ‘ought to be free of anger and 
hatred, of mercy and friendship. For where those things stand in the way, human 
opinion deceives the mind’.28 
 Borrowing from Catiline 51–4, however, went far beyond such brief 
quotations. To see this demonstrated, one can consider how Sallust’s Caesar and 
Cato were borrowed and rewritten in two texts: the continuation of the Gesta 
Frederici by Rahewin of Freising, and Gerald of Wales’ Expugnatio Hibernica. The part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Policraticus, v.12, quoting Catiline 51.2.  
28 The Chronicle of the Czechs, trans. Lisa Wolverton (Washington DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2009) iii.7, p. 189. See Lisa Wolverton, Cosmas of Prague: Narrative, Classicism, Politics 
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), pp. 21–3, for the considerable influence 
of Sallust on the Historia. 
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of the Gesta Frederici written first by Otto of Freising also contains some echoes of 
Sallust.29 More striking, however, is the work of his continuator Rahewin, c.1158–60, 
who borrows from Sallust much more heavily. Amongst these borrowings, Rahewin 
takes Sallust’s c.54 – the comparison of Caesar and Cato – and rewrites it to describe 
two figures of the politics of his own day: Duke Welf VI and Henry the Lion, whom 
he describes as ‘diversis moribus’. The comparison is a lengthy one, but what is 
more striking is the equivalence which Rahewin draws between their virtues. Duke 
Welf, like Caesar, is full of clementia; Henry the Lion, like Cato, is severe.30 There is 
nothing to choose between them – both operate on a political stage in different ways 
– but both embody virtue. 
The same is true of Gerald of Wales, the scholar and courtier to Angevin 
rulers, who had received his education first with Benedictines in Gloucester and 
subsequently in the schools of Paris. Gerald’s use of the Sallustian model of Catiline 
51–4 is even more extensive than that of Otto. In his Expugnatio Hibernica (a work 
written in 1189, describing the Angevin conquest of Ireland), Gerald effectively re-
stages the senatorial debate.31 In this context, however, the partisans of Catiline are 
transformed into Irish prisoners captured at the battle of Waterford. There is a 
lengthy set of orations in which first the case for clemency, then the case for capital 
punishment is made. This effectively rehearses the argument of Catiline, making the 
same series of points. The speaker who argues for clemency towards the prisoners 
makes the case that this is a mark of the development and maturity of a civilisation; 
the speaker who plays the part of Cato emphasises that clemency is dangerous so 
long as the Irish still present a risk to the conquerors, and would only strengthen the 
will of their enemies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 e.g. Ottonis Et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris, ed. G. Waitz (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii 
Hahniani, 1884), i.6, p. 19. 
30 Gesta Friderici, iv.46, pp. 227–8. 
31 The Conquest of Ireland, ed. A. B. Scott and Francis X. Martin (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 1978), 
i.14–15. 
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There are two points to draw out of this discussion. The first is why Rahewin 
of Freising and Gerald of Wales bothered with such staging. These extended 
comparisons cannot, I think, be explained as arising from admiration for Sallust’s 
Latin prose alone. They are too detailed and too lengthy to simply be a ‘nod’ to 
Sallust. Instead they take a Sallustian structure and use it to say something revealing 
and important about the politics of their own day, and its parallels with the classical 
world.32 The second is what their usage meant, and how we should read it. 
Fundamentally, these are extremely ambiguous; they speak to a situation in which 
two opposed courses might both plausibly be the correct one to take. The speeches of 
Caesar and Cato – the characters of Caesar and Cato – both had much to recommend 
them. 
It is here I return to John of Salisbury and the exemplum with which I began. 
John took from Valerius Maximus the example of a case which was so difficult to 
decide that no decision could be made – or, rather, where there were two ‘right’ 
courses of action. Twelfth-century readings of Sallust’s Cato and Caesar did the 
same: clemency and severity were equally admirable virtues in the abstract; the 
challenge was to understand whether Cato or Caesar should be heeded in the 
particular case of Catiline. The Sallustian debate also set out a further series of 
connections, between punishment, counsel and deliberation. The appeal of this 
pairing lay in its connection to twelfth-century scholastic understandings of moral 
virtue, and, indeed, scholastic understandings of the ordering of the universe. As 
John made clear in his commentary, while both of those qualities were virtuous, 
neither was a good on its own—they required regulation, by counsel, and through 
prudence, to determine which attitude was most appropriate to the situation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Indeed, this was not the only occasion on which Gerald of Wales reached for such a comparison – 
he borrowed it too to discuss the sons of Henry II. I discuss this further in Philippa Byrne, Justice and 
Mercy: Moral Theology and the Exercise of Law in Twelfth-Century England (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 2018), chapter 4. 
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HISTORICAL AND MORAL OPPOSITES 
To understand exactly how the historical example of Caesar’s clemency and Cato’s 
severity could be transformed into a set of moral arguments, one can look to Vincent 
of Beauvais’s Speculum maius. Vincent (d. c.1264) was a Dominican friar: his great 
speculum a compilatio (compilation) which took over three decades to assemble. 
Collated from other sources, the works of encyclopaedists before him, making 
particular use of the Florilegium Gallicum,33 Vincent presented a work which covered 
matters of nature, doctrine and history.34 In one sense, the Speculum might be said to 
lack a distinct authorial voice – Vincent adds little to his material, selecting and 
compiling from other texts, in the manner of a florilegium. However, the choices 
made by Vincent in terms of inclusion, exclusion and organisation are revealing. 
Even though the work is vast, principles of selection still apply. Vincent selects the 
useful knowledge which it is most essential that one should have access to: the 
knowledge of greatest use to preachers, moralists, students. As such, the Speculum 
maius offers a particularly useful insight into the ideas in circulation in thirteenth-
century moral theology.35 
 Among the four books of the Speculum maius is the Speculum historiale: a 
history which ran from the Fall to 1244. Book six of the Speculum historiale relates the 
last years of the Roman republic; it is in fact entitled ‘tempora Iulii Caesaris’. This 
book begins with Cicero, and extracts a great deal from Ciceronian texts. It then 
moves on to consider the work of Sallust. Cicero and Sallust had exchanged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 James Willoughby, ‘The Transmission and Circulation of Classical Literature’, Oxford History of 
Classical Reception, p. 106. 
34 The text used here is the 1964–5 facsimile of the 1624 edition: Speculum quadruplex, sive, Speculum 
maius: naturale, doctrinale, morale, historiale (4 vols., Duaci: ex officina typographica Baltazaris Belleri). 
35 More generally on Vincent, see Robert J. Schneider, ‘Vincent of Beauvais, Dominican Author: From 
Compilatio to Tractatus’, in Lector et compilator: Vincent de Beauvais, frère prêcheur, un intellectuel et son 
milieu au XIIIe siècle, ed. by Marie-Christine Duchenne et al., (Grâne: Editions Créaphis, 1997), pp. 97–
111. 
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invectives (as the Speculum explains); and Cicero had played an important role in the 
history of Catiline which Sallust narrated.36 Vincent then provides ‘flosculi Salustii in 
Catelinario’ – a selection of quotations from Catiline which attempts to summarise its 
moral theme. While beginning with brief mentions of fortune and the dangers of 
luxury and avarice, the chapter includes a lengthy quotation from Caesar’s oration to 
the Senate. The passage in question is that discussing clemency – Caesar’s warning 
to those who hold high office that punishment can quickly give way to cruelty 
(51.12–14). 
 On one hand, Vincent was only adding to the Speculum a passage which was 
found in florilegia collections, and which was admired as a compelling piece of 
oratory. On the other, the choice to include part of Caesar’s oration on clemency 
appears all the more significant when one considers what else is included in this 
book of the Speculum. Considerable attention is paid to the ‘historical’ person of 
Caesar, fleshing out his moral character by providing a series of one ‘dictum morale 
Julii Caesaris’ after another, taken from De bello Gallico.37 This is in turn followed by a 
series of moral extracts from Cicero’s De officiis which pay particular attention to the 
nature of clemency (and which attract the marginal note ‘clementia mixta cum 
severitate’).38 
Rather than setting out a straightforwardly ‘historical’ sequence of events, 
Vincent’s selections repeatedly bring the reader back to a series of moral discussions. 
His discussion of Caesar is set after quotations from one of the more famous 
passages of De officiis, praising the value of clemency: ‘for nothing is more 
commendable, nothing more becoming in a pre-eminently great man than placability 
and clemency (placabilitate atque clementia)’, and which concludes ‘it is to be desired 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Speculum historiale, 6.32–3. 
37 Speculum historiale, 6.5. 
38 In the regard, the significance of Seneca’s De clementia should also be mentioned; the text was mined 
by twelfth-century authors to provide a more detailed account of the parts of clemency than could be 
found in Cicero or florilegia. 
Philippa  Byrne,  ‘More  than  Roman  Salt’  
	  
19 
 
that they who administer the government should be like the laws, which are led to 
inflict punishment not by wrath but by justice’.39 Book 6 of the Speculum historiale 
provides a great deal of discussion of virtue and its place in history. The key author 
is certainly Cicero: his works provide the structure, he is the figure who looms 
largest; but having paid due attention to Cicero, the Speculum moves on to the life of 
Caesar, whose personal and public life is reconstructed both from Sallust and from 
Caesar’s own writings.40 The overarching theme of the treatment of Caesar is to 
emphasise the nature of his character: natura lenissimus. It suggests, at the very least, 
that the Sallustian oration provided a key component in building up a picture of 
Caesar as particularly associated with clemency, gentleness and leniency as a judge. 
The Speculum maius, however, allows us to go one step further than this. It 
provides an opportunity to consider the broader moral significance of both the tying 
of Caesar to clemency, and the comparison between Caesar and Cato. Why was that 
distinction – between clemency and severity – worth remarking on; why was it seen 
as a feature of character (or natura)? One of the reasons for this lies in the complexity 
of scholastic and moral thought on virtue and punishment. To appreciate this we can 
turn to another part of the Speculum maius, the Speculum morale. Although 
transmitted under Vincent’s name and as part of the overarching scheme of the 
Speculum maius, it was in fact composed after Vincent’s death, between c.1310 and 
c.1320, probably with material which had been left over from assembling the 
Speculum naturale and historiale.41 The Speculum morale – as a summary of key 
teachings on morality – naturally includes a discussion of the cardinal virtues of 
prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Speculum historiale, 6.7–8, quoting De officiis, i.25 (trans. Walter Miller (London: Heinemann, 1913), 
slightly adapted). 
40 Speculum historiale, 6.39. 
41 For further discussion, see Stefan Schuler, ‘Exerptoris morum genere. Zur Kompilation und 
Rezeption klassich-lateinischer Dichter im Speculum historiale des Vinzenz von Beauvais’, 
Frühmittelalterliche Studien 29 (1995), 312–48. 
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Distinctio 60 of the first book discusses justice and its associated virtues. These 
include religio, devotio et contemplatio, adoratio, obedientia, gratitudo, and, importantly, 
vindicatio – the virtue (or part of justice) which is responsible for punishment. As 
elsewhere, the Speculum compresses and abridges the kinds of discussions one could 
find in the schools and more advanced moral literature. Here, as well as providing 
an overview of how virtue is ordered (cardinal virtues, naturally, subordinate to the 
spiritual), the author of the Speculum runs through several questions. Those are: 
whether vindicatio is licit – lawful or permissible; whether it is a spiritual virtue; how 
it should be used; and, finally, who it may be exercised against. The verdict of the 
Speculum – repeating common understandings of moral theology – is that vindicatio 
is permissible. It must necessarily be so as a part of justice. This is not the case when 
it exceeds measure (excedit mensuram) in punishment, such as when it becomes 
cruelty or savagery (crudelitas vel saevitiae). Those are a defect. But otherwise, it can 
be recognised as having purpose – as Proverbs xiii recommends, it is sometimes 
necessary: the father who loves his son will discipline him when it is needed. This, 
then, returns us to the essence of Cato’s argument in the senate: sometimes 
punishment is necessary in order to restore order; severity in the right context is a 
part of the virtue of justice. 
Just as vindicatio is a virtue (or sub-species of the greater virtue of justice), so 
too is clementia, though it is a part of temperance, rather that justice. The Speculum 
morale goes on to discuss temperance and its parts,42 before then examining the 
relationship between clementia and mansuetudo (gentleness) in a subsequent 
distinctio.43 This discussion is revealing: the text defines clementia as curbing 
punishments (i.e. exterior actions), whereas mansuetudo combats internal anger. The 
purpose of clementia is thus to mitigate punishment. More importantly, however, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Speculum morale, i.97. 
43 Speculum morale, i.98. 
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Speculum then moves on to examine the relationship between severitas and clementia: 
i.e. severity in punishment and relaxation of punishment. Ostensibly, the Speculum 
explains, the two would seem to be opposed; but that is not the case when one 
further considers their relation. Severitas is inflexible concerning the infliction of 
punishment when such punishment is necessary; clementia diminishes punishment 
according to right reason. 
The conclusion of the anonymous author of the Speculum morale is that the 
application of virtue depends on the circumstances. Both severe punishment and 
mitigation of punishment may be considered acts of virtue. This serves to underline 
a more basic point. What Caesar (and Cato) demonstrate is a question of the 
interaction between different kinds of virtues – i.e. justice and temperance, and their 
constituent parts, and which should take priority. This was not merely a moral 
question, but a political one – as both Rahewin of Freising and Gerald of Wales had 
demonstrated. Choice of strategy – punitive action or clemency – could have serious 
consequences. Given this moral framework, it is perhaps unsurprising that Sallust’s 
comparison of Caesar and Cato proved valuable. It could be used to put this 
contradiction into a superior stylistic form: a summary of complex doctrine 
crystallised in a memorable historical episode. 
Constance Bouchard has suggested that medieval thought was characterised 
by a ‘discourse of opposites’ – a desire to understand the world through pairings 
and reversals, the kind of thinking embodied by the idea that ‘the last shall be first 
and the first shall be last’.44 One part of Bouchard’s argument is that this engagement 
with a model of opposition admitted no room for middle positions in twelfth-
century thought. She argues that it was not until the full reception of Aristotle’s 
Organon in the later twelfth century, and the development of an Aristotelian moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Constance Bouchard, “Every Valley Shall Be Exalted”: The Discourse of Opposites in Twelfth-Century 
Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
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philosophy in the following century, that serious thought was given to a ‘middle 
term’45 – the possibility that virtue might not be solely defined by its contraries. This 
was supported by a shift in approach to moral and philosophical thinking which 
was no longer categorised according to binary categories of opposition, but which 
instead sought a single ‘correct’ answer.46 Similarly, the reception of the Organon 
and, later still, the Ethics, has long been seen as providing the stimulus for the 
increasing importance of ‘regulation’ in thirteenth-century moral thought, creating a 
model where prudence held the other cardinal virtues in check.47 Aristotelian 
categorisation and conceptual clarity destabilised a twelfth-century mode of thinking 
where little emphasis had been placed on prudential regulation. 
Ostensibly, the twelfth-century utilisation of Caesar and Cato might seem to 
fit this narrative: the relationship between clemency and severity accords with that 
model of oppositional thinking, supposedly characteristic of the period. But, as this 
article has attempted to demonstrate, late eleventh- and twelfth-century writers were 
reading Sallust with an emphasis on conditions and circumstance. Catiline was used 
to express an argument for prudential regulation of justice. Cato and Caesar could 
demonstrate that the course of justice had necessarily to be the subject of counsel and 
examination; the ‘correct’ application of virtue might change with the prevailing 
local conditions. One did not necessarily require an Aristotelian vocabulary to make 
this point: one could derive this principle from the classical texts which made up the 
standard texts of the grammatical curriculum, and, most particularly, from Sallust.48 
This Sallustian model was available in the late eleventh century; it continued to 
appeal to authors of moral philosophy in the early fourteenth century. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Bouchard, “Every Valley Shall be Exalted”, p. 50. 
46 Bouchard, “Every Valley Shall be Exalted”, pp. 148–9. 
47 For an outline of this, see Christopher A. Franks, ‘Aristotelian Doctrines in Aquinas’s Treatment of 
Justice’, in Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology, ed. by Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pp. 139–66. 
48 I am most grateful to the journal’s anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify my thoughts and 
refine my arguments on this point. 
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DEBATABLE VIRTUES AND THE VIRTUE OF DEBATE 
Across the ‘long twelfth century’ and beyond, Sallust was used as a way into a 
discussion about just punishment and the appropriateness of showing clemency to 
offenders. Both strategies could be morally virtuous, but – crucially – not in every 
circumstance. Some judgment was required in order to determine how punitive 
power should be wielded. That was the essence of the debate in Catiline: who had 
rightly diagnosed the situation – Julius Caesar or Cato the Younger? Sallust, of 
course, was not the only classical author who might provide material for such 
discussions, but the senatorial setting, in which virtue was open to debate, seems to 
have made the text all the more compelling. Sallust staged a debate which explicitly 
addressed the connection between virtue, debate and political strategy – connecting 
the cardinal virtues to politics. Caesar and Cato provided a clear way of illuminating 
a difficult moral debate, even if there was no singular answer to the questions posed 
in the Roman senate. Small wonder, then, that this passage of Sallust captured the 
attention of a number of medieval chroniclers.  
First and foremost, one must conclude that Sallust, as a ‘moralist’, offered 
something much more than a narrative of the corruption and decline of Roman 
virtue. The usage of Catiline also reveals something about medieval interest in 
Roman deliberative oratory, and how deliberation might fit into twelfth-century 
politics. This is not to suggest that every author of this period who quoted from or 
echoed Sallust was interested in the nature of rhetorical argument. Several texts, 
however, which display a deep engagement with Sallust also place a consistent 
emphasis on oratory and the nature of argument. 
The Gesta Chonradi II imperatori, a history of the deeds of the Holy Roman 
Emperor Conrad II, written c.1046 by Wipo, Conrad’s chaplain, is packed with 
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quotations from both Catiline and Jugurtha – quotations which suggest much more 
than a passing familiarity with Sallust’s works. Throughout the Gesta, one finds an 
emphasis on themes of counsel and deliberation. Wipo repeatedly implies that what 
holds back a polity from anarchy and disorder is the wise decision-making of the 
men who counsel an emperor: ‘there would have been massacres, arson and 
plundering in many places, if the violence had not been held back by the struggles of 
eminent men (illustrium virorum)’.49 Wipo exhorts his readers to understand that 
political deeds were achieved not by chance, but through the advice of the most 
prudent men (prudentissimorum virorum consulto), who suggested action which was 
‘useful, morally worthy and the right course’.50 One cannot assume that this idea was 
straightforwardly ‘taken’ from Sallust – after all, counsel was a key part of medieval 
politics. However, given Wipo’s engagement with the nature of decision-making 
and the relationship between prudent choice and prosperity, one is tempted to 
suggest that finding these themes in Sallust may have further reinforced his interest 
in the classical historian. 
The same is true of the Gesta Guillelmi of William of Poitiers (1071–7), another 
text which borrows heavily from Sallust, and which is marked throughout by its 
emphasis on counsel. This text makes direct comparisons between William, Duke of 
Normandy (the future William I of England) and Julius Caesar, going as far as to 
suggest that William’s deeds were more impressive than those of Caesar.51 One of 
the key claims made in the text is the rightfulness of William’s claim to the throne of 
England; Edward the Confessor recognises that William is the right man to rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Gesta Chonradi II. Imperatoris, in Wiponis Opera, ed. by H. Bresslau (Hannover: Hahnsche 
Buchhandlung, 1915), p. 8. 
50 Gesta Chonradi, p. 8. 
51 John Gillingham has read the references to Julius Caesar in William of Poitiers as suggesting a new 
model of battlefield conduct, in which courtesy and restraint are emphasised. While he makes a 
persuasive case for the importance of cultural change, his account does not address the significance of 
classical rhetoric and the deliberative dimension of William’s models. Cf. John Gillingham, 
‘Conquering the Barbarians: War and Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Britain and Ireland’, in his The 
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when he observes William’s display of ‘support and counsel’ (viribus et consilio).52 
What moves political change, William of Poitiers implies, are the decisions taken by 
the wise – political action consists of listening to counsel and taking decisions. Even 
the succession to the English throne is presented as a debatable matter: ‘for the 
English, when they had discussed the question, agreed that William’s arguments 
were the best’ (disceptantes etenim Angli deliberatione suis rationibus utilissima 
consenserunt).53 
Counsel also has an important bearing on the military aspects of the conquest 
of England; it is William’s careful and conditional political judgment that makes him 
a leader of men. William of Poitiers sets up William’s Norman counsellors as a 
contemporary equivalent of the Roman senate. He describes the arrangement of 
men, both secular and religious, assembled to give counsel as ‘shining luminaries 
who were the pride of that assembly’ (quorum in collegio splendidiora quaedam eius 
lumina atque ornamenta emicuere).54 William subsequently makes the classical parallel 
even more explicit: ‘it was thanks to their wisdom and their efforts that Normandy 
could be kept in safety; supported by these the Roman republic would not have 
needed two hundred senators, if she had preserved her ancient power in our own 
time’. In every debate, this great assembly is led by the opinions of the then-Duke 
William and his prudentia.55 Likewise, the reader’s attention is drawn to the power of 
William’s elocutio; the tool which allows him to convince men to follow the most 
appropriate course of action.56 Under the pen of William of Poitiers, Hastings 
becomes less a battle than sequence of consultations and arguments in which Duke 
William triumphs through the brilliance of his deliberative oratory. Those oratorical 
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53 Gesta Guillelmi, i.14. 
54 Gesta Guillelmi, ii.1. Cf. Emily A. Winkler, ‘The Norman Conquest of the Classical Past: William of 
Poitiers, Language and History’, Journal of Medieval History 42 (2016), 456–78. 
55 Cf. Roger D. Ray, ‘Orderic Vitalis and William of Poitiers: A Monastic Reinterpretation of William 
the Conqueror’, Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 50 (1972), 1116–27, esp. 1112. 
56 Gesta Guillelmi, ii.5. 
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battles prefigure the fighting itself. William the Conqueror, merciful on the 
battlefield, is like Caesar too in his counsel.57 
The aim of this article has not been to suggest that there was only one idea 
which could be drawn out from Sallust in the twelfth century. There were other, 
important, Sallustian themes, and other aspects of the text which struck a chord with 
readers. Not the least of those was the exhortation which began Catiline – that history 
should not be passed over in silence, and that history writing was the duty of all 
men. Sallust’s admonishment was read, heeded and repeated by his medieval 
successors.58 When it came to Sallust’s treatment of Caesar and Cato, however, his 
text provided an exemplum for medieval readers that was moral, political and 
historical. It provided the material (and to some extent, the framework) for a debate 
about the connection between judgment, virtue and political action. Sallust’s 
memorialisation of Rome at one of its most politically uncertain moments offered a 
vision of difficult decision making, where two contrary ideas might be held, even 
admired, at the same time. It also invited medieval readers to think about how a 
moral choice should be made. Far from providing a sprinkling of salt to make the 
dish more delicious, Sallust offered something more difficult to swallow – a problem 
which stuck in the throat. 
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57 Cf. Gesta Guillelmi, ii.39. 
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